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ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS OF MAINE, INC. V. 
SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE: JUDICIAL 
RESTRAINT OR JUDICIAL ABDICATION? 
David Sorensen* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When Maine’s Superintendent of Insurance told the state’s largest health 
insurer that it could not profit in 2009, her decision ended up on appeal before the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, in Anthem Health Plans of 
Maine, Inc. v. Superintendent of Insurance.1  As part of its annual rate approval 
process, Anthem had requested a 3% profit and risk margin on its individual lines 
of health insurance in Maine.2  Superintendent Mila Kofman denied this request3 
under her statutory authority to deny any rate increase proposals that are 
“excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.”4  The Superintendent held that a 
profit and risk margin for 2009 would be inappropriate because of the “unique 
economic situation resulting in extreme financial hardship for subscribers” coupled 
with the “extreme financial health of the company.”5  Anthem argued that a 0% 
profit and risk margin was “inadequate” within the meaning of title 24-A, section 
2736(2) of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated.6  By the time the case was 
argued before the Law Court on November 10, 2010, Anthem’s opportunity for 
relief had passed.7  The company lacked any legal authority to retroactively charge 
its subscribers additional premiums and the issue became one of mootness.8  The 
court declined to apply one of the three mootness exceptions, citing the possibility 
of changes to health care laws at both the federal and state levels as cause for 
judicial restraint, and dismissed the appeal as moot.9   
In dismissing Anthem’s appeal, the majority, in a three-page opinion, placed 
an unusually heavy reliance on the prospect of future changes to statutory law.  
This Note will examine the reasoning behind the Law Court’s decision and its 
ramifications, arguing that although moot, the appeal did fit within a mootness 
exception and a decision on its merits would have provided guidance on an 
important question of law while remaining squarely within the Law Court’s proper 
role within the branches of government.  This Note begins, in Part II, by examining 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Maine School of Law.  I would like to thank Mr. Henry 
Evans and Dr. James D. Rice for teaching me how to write. 
 1. 2011 ME 48, 18 A.3d 824 (5-2 decision). 
 2. Id. ¶ 2. 
 3. Id. 
 4. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2736(2) (Supp. 2011-2012).  
 5. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield 2010 Individual Rate Filing for HealthChoice, HealthChoice 
Standard and Basic, and Lumenos Consumer Directed Health Plan Products, No. INS–10–1000 at 21, 
Decision and Order (Me. Bur. of Ins. Sept. 2, 2010). 
 6. Brief of Appellant at 10-11, Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2011 
ME 48, 18 A.3d 824 (No. BCD-10-255).  
 7. Anthem, 2011 ME 48, ¶ 6, 18 A.3d 824.  
 8. Id. ¶ 7. 
 9. Id. ¶ 14. 
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the relevant law of health insurance rate review and the mootness doctrine and its 
exceptions.  Part III will explore the Anthem decision itself: the factual background, 
the parties’ arguments, and the reasoning employed by both the majority and the 
dissent.  Part IV will critique the decision, arguing that the court should have 
reached the merits of the case and that the concern over changing law was both 
inappropriate and unfounded.  Lastly, Part V will conclude the Note with some 
final thoughts on the ramifications of the Anthem decision.  
II.  THE STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW BEHIND THE ANTHEM DECISION 
A.  The Rate Review Process  
Under Maine law, insurers are required to file any proposed rate increase for 
their individual and small group health insurance plans with the Superintendent of 
Insurance,10 who may approve or deny such a change based on whether the 
proposed rate is “excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.”11  An excessive 
rate is one that is too high,12 an unfairly discriminatory rate is one that 
unreasonably burdens one policyholder over another,13 and an inadequate rate is 
one that either causes the insurer to lose money or simply does not generate a 
profit, depending on whose interpretation prevails.14  It is this last issue of defining 
“inadequate” that constitutes the merits of the Anthem appeal.15   
Once the Superintendent renders a decision, the insurer may appeal that 
decision to a trial court by filing a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
in the appropriate Superior Court.16  The insurer or the Superintendent may appeal 
the Superior Court’s decision to the Law Court, which reviews agency records 
directly, “to determine whether the agency abused its discretion, committed an 
error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.”17  However, the Law Court is deferential to the Superintendent’s 
interpretation of statutes “and will overturn the Superintendent's action only if the 
                                                                                                                 
 10. 6 C.M.R. 02031 940-2 § 6(D) (2006). 
 11. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2736(2) (Supp. 2012).  
 12. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 12 (defining excessive as setting one of the “boundaries 
within which rates must be set: not so high that they are excessive with respect to customers . . . .”); 
Brief of Appellee at 13-14, Anthem, 2011 ME 48, 18 A.3d 824 (No. BCD-10-255) (noting Appellant’s 
definition of “excessive” without objection). 
 13. There is little language defining unfair discrimination within the context of individual health 
insurance rates.  Cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2382(4) (2008) (defining unfair discrimination in 
Workers’ Compensation rates as follows: “Unfair discrimination exists if, after allowing for practical 
limitations, price differentials fail to reflect equitably the differences in expected losses and expenses.  A 
rate is not unfairly discriminatory because different premiums result for policyholders with like loss 
exposures but different expenses, or like expenses but different loss exposures, so long as the rate 
reflects the differences with reasonable accuracy.”) 
 14. For two interpretations, see Brief of Appellee, supra note 12, at 18-19, which describes the “not 
inadequate” requirement as a solvency standard, and Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 10-11, which 
describes “not inadequate” as requiring a “fair and reasonable rate of return.” 
 15. Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2011 ME 48, ¶ 1, 18 A.3d 824. 
 16. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 11002 (2002); ME. R. CIV. P. 80C. 
 17. Consumers for Affordable Health Care, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2002 ME 158, ¶ 22, 809 
A.2d 1233 (citing Green v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Mental Health, Mental Retardation & Substance Abuse 
Servs., 2001 ME 86, ¶ 9, 776 A.2d 612). 
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statute or regulation plainly compels a contrary result.”18 
Maine’s general scheme of requiring small group and individual health 
insurers to file rate increases with a commissioner or a superintendent who has the 
authority to approve or deny the proposal, and allowing the insurer to appeal the 
agency’s decision to a court, is similar in its broad outlines to regulatory procedures 
followed in other states.19  Many states also use the language, “excessive, 
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory” in establishing what constitutes 
impermissible rates.20    
In Massachusetts, however, the Commissioner of Insurance is not empowered, 
upon a finding that the rate is impermissible, to set rates, but rather may only 
approve or deny the insurer’s rate request.21  New York law provides that an 
insurer may forgo the rate approval process altogether and avoid the 
superintendent’s scrutiny by submitting a rate increase with a loss ratio that falls 
between 82% and 105% and is accompanied by an actuarial certification of 
accuracy.22  Echoing Maine Superintendent Kofman’s economic considerations on 
behalf of policyholders, Delaware allows its insurance commissioner to consider 
“administrative expenses” due to “trends in the economy” that may benefit insurers 
and to bring in expert witnesses to speak to those concerns in determining the 
reasonableness of rates.23   
B.  Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine 
The adversarial nature of the American judicial system demands that when a 
case comes before a court, it must contain a “real and substantial controversy, 
admitting of specific relief through a judgment of conclusive character,” or else it is 
moot and will be dismissed.24  Such a controversy exists only when “there remain 
sufficient practical effects flowing from the resolution of [the] litigation to justify 
the application of limited judicial resources.”25  There are, however, three 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine that are recognized by Maine courts:  
(1) sufficient collateral consequences will result from the determination of 
the questions presented so as to justify relief;  
(2) the appeal contains questions of great public concern that, in the 
interest of providing future guidance to the bar and the public, [the court] 
may address; or  
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. ¶ 30 (quoting Me. AFL-CIO v. Superintendent of Ins., 595 A.2d 424, 429 (Me. 1991)). 
 19. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176M §§ 1-5 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 18, §§ 
2503-2508, 2531 (2011); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4308 (McKinney 2011). 
 20. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 4308(b) (McKinney 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2501 (2011). 
 21. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176M, § 5(e) (West 2010). See also Blue Cross of Mass., Inc. v. 
Comm’r of Ins., 489 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (Mass. 1986).  
 22. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4308(g)(1) (McKinney 2011). See also In re Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. 
Serio, 809 N.E.2d 651, 652 (N.Y. 2004).  
 23. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Del., Inc. v. Elliott, 479 A.2d 843, 847-48 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1984). 
 24. Smith v. Hannaford Bros., 2008 ME 8, ¶ 6, 940 A.2d 1079 (quoting Lewiston Daily Sun v. Sch. 
Admin. Dist. No. 43, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 16, 738 A.2d 1239). 
 25. Id. (quoting Lewiston Daily Sun, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 14, 738 A.2d 1239). 
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(3) the issues are capable of repetition but evade review because of their 
fleeting or determinate nature.26   
For example, in Maine School Administrative District 37 v. Pineo, when two town 
selectmen refused to sign warrants and notices of elections that they believed to be 
illegal, the Law Court found an exception in an otherwise moot case because the 
issue was one of great public concern and capable of repetition.27  Conversely, in 
Maine Civil Liberties Union v. South Portland, when the City of South Portland 
consolidated municipal voting districts for a special election on unusually short 
notice due to outside circumstances, the court held that the confluence of events 
was too unlikely to be repeated for the case to fall within the third exception.28 
It is common for states to carve out exceptions to the mootness doctrine in 
their case law.  States share much of the language used to enunciate these 
exceptions, perhaps because some of it originated in federal courts.  The phrase 
“capable of repetition, yet evading review,” for example, came from the U.S. 
Supreme Court case of Southern Pacific Terminal Company v. Interstate 
Commerce Commission.29  The federal courts further explain their equivalent of 
Maine’s third mootness exception by providing that it only applies when, in the 
absence of a class action, “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to 
be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable 
expectation that the complaining party would be subjected to the same action 
again.”30   
New York state courts recognize three mootness exceptions, which include: 
“(1) a likelihood of repetition, either between the parties or among other members 
of the public; (2) a phenomenon typically evading review; and (3) a showing of 
significant or important questions not previously passed on, i.e., substantial and 
novel issues.”31  Maine’s third exception seems to combine New York’s first two, 
and New York’s “substantial and novel issues” exception may overlap in some 
cases with Maine’s public interest exception, but there is no New York equivalent 
to Maine’s “sufficient collateral consequences” exception.   
Connecticut courts recognize two classes of mootness exceptions.  First, when 
“prejudicial collateral consequences are reasonably possible”; meaning, “if the 
actual injury suffered by the litigant potentially gives rise to a collateral injury from 
which the court can grant relief.”32  Second, when issues presented are “capable of 
repetition, yet evading review,” an intensive, three-part test is applied to determine 
eligibility under the mootness exception.33   
In Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Commissioner of Insurance, a rate 
review case similar to Anthem, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court provided 
the following insightful reasoning:  
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Lewiston Daily Sun, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 17, 738 A.2d 1239). 
 27. 2010 ME 11, ¶ 10, 988 A.2d 987.   
 28. 1999 ME 121, ¶ 11, 734 A.2d 191.   
 29. 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). 
 30. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).   
 31. In re Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 409 N.E.2d 876, 878 (N.Y. 1980).   
 32. State v. McElveen, 802 A.2d 74, 79 (Conn. 2002).  
 33. Loisel v. Rowe, 660 A.2d 323, 330 (Conn. 1995).   
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The Commissioner argues that the statute does not permit retroactive rate 
adjustment and that the case is therefore moot. We need not decide 
whether retroactive rate adjustment is permissible. If it is permissible, then 
the case is obviously not moot. If it is not permissible, then the case falls 
within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the 
mootness doctrine.34   
Such was the extent of the explanation that the Massachusetts high court believed 
was necessary to apply that state’s equivalent of Maine’s third mootness exception 
to a case that was technically moot for the same reason as Anthem.   
III.  THE ANTHEM DECISION 
A.  Factual Background 
Anthem Maine is a subsidiary of Wellpoint, Inc., the largest health benefits 
company in the country by membership.35  Anthem sells four different individual 
insurance products in Maine,36 which together make up 6.5% of the company’s 
business in the state.37  Maine’s Superintendent of Insurance sets rates for the 
company’s individual and small group business, but Anthem’s large group policies 
may charge whatever the market will bear.38  From 2000, when Anthem began 
selling the products in question, to 2008, the company was generally approved for a 
3% profit and risk margin within an average annual approved rate increase of 
14.58%.39  Anthem first filed its 2009 proposed rate increase on December 22, 
2008, requesting a 14.5% increase with a May 1, 2009 effective date.40  The 
company amended this filing in January 2009 to 18.1% for a July 1 effective date, 
and then again in March for an 18.5% increase, also to be effective on July 1.41  
The final proposal entailed a nearly $1100 average premium increase for 12,000 
individual policyholders in Maine,42 and a 3% profit and risk margin for Anthem.43  
As is customary in rate proceedings before the Bureau of Insurance, both the public 
and the state’s Attorney General participated and gave their input.44  The Attorney 
General, on behalf of consumers, argued against allowing a profit and risk margin 
and members of the public opposed the rate increase generally through three public 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Blue Cross of Mass., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ins., 465 N.E.2d 252, 254 (Mass. 1984) (citation 
omitted).   
 35. Brief of Appellee, supra note 12, at 3. 
 36. Anthem Maine’s individual plans are HealthChoice, HealthChoice Standard, HealthChoice 
Basic, and Lumenos Consumer-Directed Health Plan.  Id. at 7. 
 37. Id. at 2. 
 38. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
 39. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 12, at 10.  The Author arrived at this figure by manually 
averaging the several years' worth of rate increases by adding and dividing. 
 40. Id. at 8. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 9. The Author arrived at this figure because "before rate increase" is $5,831, 
subtracted from "after rate increase," which is listed as $6,924 makes $1,093, or nearly $1100. 
 43. Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2011 ME 48, ¶ 2, 18 A.3d 824. 
 44. ME. BUREAU OF INS., PRELIMINARY REPORT: THE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET IN MAINE 13-
15 (Feb. 2010); Brief of Appellee, supra note 12, at 11.  
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hearings and written testimony.45      
Superintendent Kofman denied Anthem’s filing and immediately, as required 
by statute,46 provided Anthem with a rate increase that she would approve: 10.9% 
with a 0% profit and risk margin.47  Anthem appealed to the Superior Court, which 
found the Superintendent’s decision to be statutorily and constitutionally sound.48  
Anthem then appealed to the Law Court and, while the appeal was pending, filed 
its rate increase proposal for 2010 with the Superintendent.49  For the 2010 
proposal, the Attorney General recommended a 0% profit and risk margin, and 
Anthem again requested a 3% margin, but the Superintendent allowed for a slight 
profit of 0.5%50 in a decision of which the Law Court took judicial notice during 
the appeal of the 2009 case.51  
B.  The Parties’ Arguments and the Law Court’s Reasoning 
The issue on appeal before the Law Court was whether the Superintendent 
“may establish rates for individual health insurance products pursuant to which the 
insurer will not make a profit, but will break even.”52  Anthem argued that the 
Constitutions of both Maine and the United States require that title 24-A, section 
2736 of the Maine Revised Statutes be interpreted in such a way that insurers have 
a right to earn a “fair and reasonable rate of return,” and that the Superintendent 
cannot use cross-subsidization by an insurer’s other products to satisfy that 
requirement.53  The Superintendent argued that the “not inadequate” requirement in 
section 2736 is a solvency standard, designed to ensure not that insurers earn a 
profit but that they are able to satisfy claims, that rate orders need only be just and 
reasonable to be constitutional, and that the history of profitability of Anthem’s 
individual plans defeats Anthem’s allegation of mandated cross-subsidization.54   
The court brushed aside these arguments on the merits and held that because 
the issue was not replicated in the then-current 2010 rate filing before the 
Superintendent, who had already approved a 0.5% profit and risk margin, and 
because Anthem would not be able to retroactively collect rate increases from 
consumers, “a decision in Anthem’s favor would provide it with no effective 
relief,” and was therefore moot.55  The dissent agreed that the case was “technically 
moot.”56   
The majority declined to fit the case into one of the three mootness exceptions, 
after considering the second and third of them, in part because of the prospect of 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Brief of Appellee, supra note 12, at 11. 
 46. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2736-B (2000).  
 47. Anthem, 2011 ME 48, ¶ 2, 18 A.3d 824. 
 48. Id. ¶ 3. 
 49. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. 
 50. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield 2010 Individual Rate Filing for HealthChoice, HealthChoice 
Standard and Basic, and Lumenos Consumer Directed Health Plan Products, No. INS–10–1000 at 21-
22, Decision and Order (Me. Bur. of Ins. Sept. 2, 2010).  
 51. Anthem, 2011 ME 48, ¶ 4 n.3, 18 A.3d 824. 
 52. Id. ¶ 1. 
 53. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 10-11. 
 54. Brief of Appellee, supra note 12, at 18-19. 
 55. Anthem, 2011 ME 48, ¶ 7, 18 A.3d 824. 
 56. Id. ¶ 15 (Levy, J., dissenting). 
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changes to health care laws at both the state and national levels.57  The court dealt 
first with the third exception, which applies to moot cases where the issues may be 
repeated but their fleeting nature makes them evasive of review.58  Doubting that 
the “precise issues presented in this case will recur” because the Superintendent’s 
decision regarding the 2009 rates was made in consideration of a “unique economic 
situation”59 and because of the potential for change in healthcare regulation, the 
court held that the case would not be capable of repetition.60  Next, regarding the 
second mootness exception, which applies to “questions of great public concern 
that, in the interest of providing future guidance to the bar and the public, [the 
court] may address,”61 the majority simply concluded that even if a great public 
concern existed, judicial restraint is in order because of possible changes to health 
care laws in the future.62   
The dissent believed that the majority erred in looking at the issue as the 
narrow one of whether the Superintendent was correct in setting a 0% profit margin 
for Anthem in 2009, under the circumstances.63  The issue, the dissent argued, is 
broader; particularly, whether “rates that are ‘not … inadequate’ must include a 
reasonable return, including a reasonable profit.”64  The dissent took issue with the 
majority’s assessment of whether the case fell within the third mootness exception, 
arguing that since the issue on appeal arose from an annual rate review process, it is 
naturally fleeting,65 and since the Superintendent has not abandoned or modified 
her interpretation of the statute, which Anthem contends was applied again in the 
2010 rate filing, the issue is indeed capable of repetition.66  The dissenters did not 
opine as to the merits of the case.   
IV.  CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION 
A.  A Mootness Exception Was Appropriate 
The issue on appeal in Anthem properly fit within the third, and perhaps the 
second, mootness exceptions.  Although Anthem argued for both the second and 
third exceptions,67 the dissent focused on the third in its objection to the majority’s 
position.68  The first exception, which requires that “[s]ufficient collateral 
consequences will result from the determination of the questions presented so as to 
justify relief,”69 was inapplicable here, and thus unaddressed by either party or the 
court, because in the absence of an ability to retroactively charge consumers, no 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. ¶ 1 (majority). 
 58. Id. ¶ 8. 
 59. Id. ¶ 10. 
 60. Id. ¶ 14. 
 61. Id. ¶ 8. 
 62. Id. ¶ 11. 
 63. Id. ¶ 17 (Levy, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. ¶ 16. 
 66. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. 
 67. Id. ¶ 9 (majority). 
 68. Id. ¶ 15 (Levy, J., dissenting). 
 69. Smith v. Hannaford Bros., 2008 ME 8, ¶ 8, 940 A.2d 1079 (quoting Lewiston Daily Sun v. Sch. 
Admin. Dist. No. 43, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 17, 738 A.2d 1239). 
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sufficient collateral consequences resulting from the decision would have directly 
benefited Anthem.  Litigants seeking the application of the first mootness exception 
must demonstrate that relief on the merits of their case will have “more than 
conjectural and insubstantial consequences.”70  For example, the Law Court found 
no sufficient collateral consequences to flow from a revocation of parole when, at 
the time of appeal, an appellant had already served his unsuspended term of 
imprisonment but argued that the revocation of parole would leave a negative mark 
on his record, which would be to his detriment for sentencing purposes if convicted 
of another crime in the future.71   
When considering application of the second, public interest exception, courts 
consider “whether the question is public or private, how much court officials need 
an authoritative determination for future rulings, and how likely the question is to 
recur in the future.”72  While the issue in Anthem concerned a public agency, the 
appellant in the case was a private corporation.73  Additionally, issues that fall 
within the public concern exception have concerned subjects such as the authority 
of public officials in relation to one another74 and the establishment of a public 
charitable health care trust;75 matters that are of more direct public concern than the 
denial of Anthem’s requested profit and risk margin.  However, although Anthem 
is a private corporation, it is in an extraordinarily regulated market, making it 
naturally intertwined with a government agency and thus making the question quite 
public.  Furthermore, the issue on appeal affects the insurance rates of 
approximately 12,000 people in Maine,76 making it arguably one of “great public 
concern.”77  While a stronger case can be made with the third exception, the second 
exception is applicable here as well.  Notably, in dismissing the public concern 
argument, the majority forwent this analysis and based their decision on restraint in 
the face of yet unrealized challenges and deference to the policy prerogatives of the 
political branches.78   
However, the third exception, which applies when “the issues are capable of 
repetition but evade review because of their fleeting or determinate nature,”79 is 
particularly appropriate for the Anthem appeal.  The majority held that the 
particular facts at issue in Anthem were unlikely to recur because of the economic 
hardship of 2009 and the potential for policy changes, but as the dissent argued, the 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Sordyl v. Sordyl, 1997 ME 87, ¶ 6, 692 A.2d 1386 (quoting Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins. v. 
Superintendent of Ins., 538 A.2d 759, 763-764 (Me. 1988)) (quotation marks omitted).  
 71. State v. Irish, 551 A.2d 860, 861-62 (Me. 1988).   
 72. Me. Sch. Dist. No. 37 v. Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶ 9, 988 A.2d 987 (quoting Young v. Young, 2002 
ME 167, ¶ 9, 810 A.2d 418) (quotation marks omitted). 
 73. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 12, at 3 (describing the ownership of Anthem Maine). 
 74. See Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶¶ 2-4, 988 A.2d 987. 
 75. See Consumers for Affordable Health Care v. Superintendent of Ins., 2002 ME 158, ¶ 2, 809 
A.2d 1233. 
 76. Brief of Appellee, supra note 12, at 7. 
 77. Smith v. Hannaford Bros., 2008 ME 8, ¶ 8, 940 A.2d 1079 (quoting Lewiston Daily Sun v. Sch. 
Admin. Dist. No. 43, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 17, 738 A.2d 1239). 
 78. Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2011 ME 48, ¶¶ 11-13, 18 A.3d 
824.  
 79. Smith, 2008 ME 8, ¶ 8, 940 A.2d 1079 (quoting Lewiston Daily Sun, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 17, 738 
A.2d 1239). 
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issue is actually the broader one of whether a 0% profit and risk margin is 
“inadequate” for the purposes of section 2736.  Even if one concedes that the scope 
of the issue is as narrow as the majority presents it, it is quite likely that Maine and 
the nation will see economically difficult years again.  In fact, economic conditions 
in 2010 were such that the Attorney General again argued for a 0% profit and risk 
margin.80   
But it is the fleeting or determinate nature, and not the repetitive nature, of the 
issue that is the emphasis of the exception, and as the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held in Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., and the dissent argued in 
Anthem, an annual rate review process without any possibility of retroactive billing 
provides the epitome of a fleeting issue.  An appeal by an insurer from an agency 
decision is nearly impossible to bring to the Law Court without being moot because 
of this dynamic.   Insurers must file rate change requests annually81 and wait up to 
60 days for a decision.82  They may then appeal an adverse decision to the Superior 
Court,83 wait for its decision (which may take the better part of a year) and finally, 
appeal to the Law Court.84  If specificity of circumstances is what the majority saw 
when dismissing the possibility of these issues recurring, then it may have 
considered that an appeal of a Superintendent’s decision is set apart from appeals in 
non-administrative cases, as it must traverse an extra adjudicative layer—the 
Superior Court, in its capacity as intermediate appellate court—before it reaches 
the Law Court.85   
Furthermore, the propriety of using the third exception in Anthem would have 
been borne out by the case law.  Unlike in Maine Civil Liberties Union, there is 
only one event that would have to recur in order for the issue in Anthem to come 
before the Law Court again: the denial of a profit and risk margin.  In Pineo, the 
“truncated timeline” between the refusal of officials to sign warrants and the 
election itself called for the application of the third mootness exception.86  So, too, 
should the truncated timeline between when an insurer’s appeal is filed and when 
that appeal becomes moot have necessitated the application of the third mootness 
exception in Anthem.  
B.  The Majority Overemphasized Legislative Concerns 
The major shortcoming of the Law Court’s decision, however, is not that it 
dismissed the appeal as moot, but that it did so by relying on the highly speculative 
prospect of future changes to or from new legislation instead of on present legal 
reality.  Indeed the very principles that provide the jurisprudential underpinnings of 
the mootness doctrine also provide the reason why the court should not have based 
                                                                                                                 
 80. The Attorney General argued that “the conditions she cited last year still have not changed.”  
Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield 2010 Individual Rate Filing for HealthChoice, HealthChoice 
Standard and Basic, and Lumenos Consumer Directed Health Plan Products, No. INS–10–1000 at 21, 
Decision and Order (Me. Bur. of Ins. Sept. 2, 2010).  
 81. 6 C.M.R. 02031 940-2 § 6(D) (2006). 
 82. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2736-B (2000). 
 83. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 11002(1) (2002). 
 84. ME. R. CIV. P. 80C(m). 
 85. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 11002(1) (2010). 
 86. Me. Sch. Dist. No. 37 v. Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶ 10, 988 A.2d 987. 
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its decision on “the potential for change in healthcare regulation” and concerns that 
the statute at issue “may well be altered, amended, or eliminated.”87  Such concerns 
involve “hypothetical or future”88 changes such as those in Smith, and thus are not 
“real and substantial.”89   
The majority’s concerns about health care policy were not only inappropriate 
but largely unfounded.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(ACA),90 the major health care reform law recently enacted in Congress, has two 
main provisions that could possibly affect rate regulation.  First, under the reform, 
federal regulators will target insurers who impose “unreasonable” rate increases on 
subscribers, soliciting input from states on what constitutes an unreasonable rate 
increase.91  The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will then 
require insurers who impose unreasonable rate increases to produce documents 
justifying the new rates, which will be available to the public on a federal 
website.92  This modest new rule is not designed to supersede any state law 
regulating insurance rates, and federal regulators will not have the power to 
approve or deny even those rates they determine to be unreasonable.93  Maine will 
remain free to review rate increases in the same way it did when Superintendent 
Kofman denied Anthem’s 2009 increase request.  Second, beginning in 2011, the 
ACA requires individual health insurers to meet an 80% loss ratio, meaning that 
insurers’ claims paid must total at least 80% of revenues.94  Over the five rate years 
2004-2008, Anthem’s loss ratio averaged 88%, never falling below 80%.95  In 
short, the common consensus among experts seems to be that the ACA lacks 
“regulatory teeth” when it comes to rate increases on individual health insurance 
policies and that states will continue to regulate rates in much the way that they 
have been.96  That being established, the Law Court’s position that “judicial 
restraint is appropriate” because “a shift in public policy . . . has been discussed 
following the recent election”97 is without basis because a repeal or successful 
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court challenge to a law that had no effect in the first place on the issue before the 
court does not constitute a shift in public policy that warrants restraint.     
In an attempt to compensate for this shortfall, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-
CA) and Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) introduced a bill in March 2010 to 
allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services to regulate rate increases in 
states where such regulation does not occur on the state level.98  Maine is not one 
of those states and Feinstein’s bill failed.99  Feinstein introduced a similar bill in 
January of 2011,100 but if anything its chances for passage are significantly less 
likely this time around and even if it did become law, Maine would still not be one 
of those states affected.101  It is therefore unlikely that ACA will develop those 
regulatory teeth and upset Maine’s regulatory applecart in any meaningful way.       
Changes at the state level similarly fail to live up to the majority’s 
expectations.  Although the court declined to reach the merits in part because “a 
new Governor and a substantially changed Legislature have not yet had a chance to 
weigh in on the policy issues presented,”102 the Governor’s first budget address was 
one such chance, and he made no reference to the state’s private health insurance 
market.103  The legislature began to weigh in a month before the court issued its 
decision, referring a health care reform bill to the Committee on Insurance and 
Financial Services that did not affect the rate review process.104  The bill, L.D. 
1333, was ultimately enacted weeks after the Law Court’s decision and its final 
version contains a provision that exempts individual insurers from rate review if 
their requested rate increase is less than ten percent and their loss ratio is at least 
80%.105  The company consistently achieves a loss ratio in excess of 80%,106 but 
only twice in the ten rate years107 from 2001 to 2011 did Anthem request a rate 
increase of less than ten percent.108  Thus, Anthem would still routinely face rate 
reviews if its proposals continue to follow this pattern.  The rate review process 
itself remains the same—courts may still face the question of whether a rate with 
no profit and risk margin is an inadequate rate.  If anything, the imposition of these 
stringent loss ratio requirements will leave less room for profit, leading to more 
frequent denials by the Superintendent of requested profit and risk margins.  
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Leaving aside prudential concerns, neither recent changes and challenges to federal 
law, nor recent changes to state law, when examined closely, give reason for the 
Law Court to discard mootness exceptions. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Law Court’s decision in Anthem poses an interesting prospect for 
observers of the judiciary: did the court signal an intention to refrain from decision-
making when faced with murky, but as yet undisturbed, regulatory waters?  This 
should concern those who believe that the courts should act as detached arbiters, 
confined to the facts before them and not the evening news, and that courts have 
just as great an obligation to act when appropriate as to defer when not.  The 
concern is especially real when one considers that the legislation to which the court 
referred, when examined closely, does little to affect the question presented and its 
prospects for recurrence, revealing the extent to which the Law Court stepped back.  
Indeed the court even seemed to give new meaning to the term “judicial 
restraint”—used primarily within the context of deciding whether to strike down 
statutes, it has been applied to a case involving whether to reverse a decision from 
below.  Time will tell the prudence of actions by the legislatures, but in the more 
principled world of the judiciary, actions are immediately ripe for review.  This one 
is cause for concern.       
 
